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Matthew O'Doimell 
Revolution 
The word 'revolution' has been devalued by being so widely spread. 
One hears of revolutions not only in political organisation and tech 
nology, but also in tastes and toothpaste. Even when one confines the 
term to political revolution the phenomenon is still one of impressive 
complexity and variety. In this article I shall not attempt any com 
prehensive treatment of revolution, but only to indicate certain general 
characteristics of it which I believe to be relevant to its evaluation. 
CONDEMNATION AND ACCLAMATION 
Revolutions are frequently greeted, at the time, by condemnation; and 
subsequently, if successful, by acclamation. In this year of 1976 the 
American Revolution has few detractors, and the French Revolution 
and the Irish Revolution of 1916 have equally few. But in their various 
times they were very generally condemned. 
This suggests that the evaluation of revolution presents a problem. 
If it is right, it is right in its time; and there should be some way where 
by that Tightness can be recognised at the time. The later emergence 
of a consensus is of no use to the contemporaries who must decide 
whether to support, resist or ignore the revolution. In fact it seems that 
contemporaries seldom recognise a good revolution in its time; which 
is remarkable, for recognition is not generally handicapped by one's 
being present. 
I would suggest that there are a number of reasons why people tend 
to condemn a revolution in its time and acclaim it subsequently. 
(1) The successful revolution incorporates itself in the traditions of 
a people, and thus acquires a kind of sanctity. Veneration is paid to it 
as one source of the values enshrined in one's society. This veneration 
however, does not necessarily imply that the present supporters of the 
historic revolution would have been supporters at the time; nor does it 
guarantee that they would support revolutionary measures in the present 
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situation or in any conceivable situation. Contemporary condemna 
tion and later veneration are not continuous; they are not judgements 
about the same thing. The o??q is a judgement about a revolution which 
is currently impinging on the judger, the other is a component in the 
overall patriotic reaction of a citizen. 
(2) Another line of explanation is that people judge badly in areas 
where they are unaccustomed to making judgements. An ornithologist 
will recognise a bar-tailed godwit, a fisherman the signs of an approach 
ing storm, a stockbroker an attractive investment prospect, because in 
each case he is accustomed to making such judgements. As the citizen 
is not accustomed to judging of revolutions, it is not really surprising 
that he should judge badly. 
(3) A third line of explanation is that we tend to favour the old 
familiar ways. There is a kind of principle of inertia in our judgements 
whereby the familiarity of the old can outweigh the obvious virtues of 
the new. The dice will always be loaded against the approval of re 
volution by the people it affects, simply on account of the radically 
disturbing nature of revolution. This influence, however, does not bear 
on subsequent generations; for the radical disturbance is away in the 
past, and it has contributed to producing the present state of affairs. 
The past revolution is tame and familiar. It is entirely understandable 
that it does not produce the fear and hostility generated by a presently 
operative revolution. 
(4) A fourth explanatory consideration is that revolution, to its con 
temporaries, is a project, a promise, a hope. It is an offering on the 
altar of an idealised future. The future may be better or worse than the 
present as a result of the revolution; but while the revolution is in pro 
gress no one knows. It is much easier for later generations to approve 
of the revolution on account of the changes which it has wrought. 
ADMIRATION AND REVULSION 
The historical variation in people's judgement of revolution is paral 
leled by an ambivalence within the individual's judgement. The revolu 
tionary may provoke admiration and revulsion simultaneously in the 
same person. 
There is a natural sympathy with the revolutionary as the underdog. 
He is the one on the run, living in fear and discomfort, who survives 
against the odds. There is also admiration for the revolutionary. 
This relates to his efficiency, but even more importantly to 
his qualities of courage and self-sacrifice. In fact admiration is 
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often accorded to courage and self-sacrifice even if efficiency is lack 
ing. The revolutionary is also admired as the one who has broken out 
of the rut. His is seen as a life of excitement, exhilaration, intensity, 
which contrasts to the dullness of routine. And the violence that he 
practises can be seen as a kind of thrust and initiative which 
con 
trasts to the passivity and drift of most men's lives. There is no need 
to labour the point. People admire revolutionaries even though they 
might not ever join them, or support them or even formally approve of 
what they do. 
This admiration however is balanced by revulsion at the revolution 
ary's killing and destroying; balanced, but not cancelled. It is sadden 
ing that men 
- 
any men 
- should die; and for any reason. And it 
is saddening that men 
- 
any men 
- should kill; and for any reason. 
The destruction of property is saddening too, for property is the spore 
of human living. Its destruction is saddening because it deprives some 
one not of a possession but of part of what his life has been. Politically 
motivated destruction is only incidentally a modification of the material 
environment; it is essentially the hurting of people in order to coerce 
them. To stamp out a child's sandcastle is not principally to deprive 
him of something but rather to negate what he has done. It is less a 
deprivation than an affront. 
The revolutionary provokes revulsion because he is a destroyer. He 
may destroy to rebuild better, and the better may be badly needed, 
and there may be no better way. But the revolution remains and will 
always remain in the realm of the regrettable. 
The moral evaluation of revolution, however, is quite independent of 
one's emotive reaction to it. The person who is appalled by it is not 
committed to moral disapproval, and the person who admires it is not 
committed to moral approval. Furthermore, these opposite emotional 
reactions are not incompatible. Both the admiration and the revulsion 
are uncritical untutored reactions, and neither determines the moral 
judgement. 
Prior to detailed reflection one is then inclined to regard revolution 
neither as simply right nor as simply wrong. There is a question mark 
against it. Such question marks may be left there for ever, unless one 
feels called on to take a stand. Most of us do not feel obliged to hold 
views on the value of the cultural achievements of the Ming dynasty. 
But in this country at this time one surely is called to try to arrive 
at some rational convictions concerning the morality of revolutionary 
violence. 
To do this one must first stand back a little from the problem, to 
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enquire what kind of thing revolution is, why it is engaged in and 
what its purpose is. 
SOCIETY AND PATRIOTISM 
Revolution is a procedure for drastically reorganising a state for the 
benefit of its people. It is a truism that men are social beings but not a 
triviality. It points to the essential character of human sociability. 
Sociability is not something superadded to an individuality which is a 
total humanity; sociability is rather part of what it is to be human. 
So society, in the sense of a coming together of men is both a unity 
and a multiplicity. It is not the nominal unity and real multiplicity of a 
heap of stones, nor the instinctive unity of a herd. Neither is it the 
logical unity of a class of humans 
- like the class of whole numbers 
- with humanity as the membership determinant; for belonging to 
society is part cf humanity. Society is a union of persons which ex 
presses itself as the equality and interdependence of the many. 
Such an approach to society is, no doubt, an attractive ideal, but it 
is not what happens. In fact people are jealous, selfish, uncooperative 
and lazy, and society is the area in which they exercise these qualities. 
Society, in other words, contains the seeds of its own destruction. 
The wonder is that it survives at all. But it must be made survive 
because men would be truncated without it. The state is the necessary 
source of supervision and coercion which are needed to ensure that the 
individual has a reasonable chance of achieving in society what he can 
and should achieve. It is there to ensure that the anti-social tendencies 
of men shall not prevail; that human fellowship will have an oppor 
tunity to flourish. 
This is the line of thought that is summed up in the old adage 'the 
state is a natural society'. It is in the nature of things that there be 
states; it is not the result of chance or human decision. That there be 
states is dictated by the imperative need of association for human 
development, and by the need for the organisation and supervision of 
such association. 
States are inevitable; but the number, extent and political structure 
of individual states are not predetermined in any way. These can 
change, and have changed very radically in the course of history. 
Compare today's map of Europe, for instance, with what it was in 
Roman times and in the early years of this century. 
States change for many reasons, because of empire-building, wars, 
dynastic accidents, economic factors, decadence - and, not least, by 
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revolution. If we discount the sheer coup d'etat, revolution is always 
motivated by dissatisfaction with the state's performance; it is not doing 
for its citizens what it is there to do. Its function is, in the traditional 
phrase, 'to promote the common good' or, 
in the words of the 1916 
Proclamation 'to cherish all the children of the nation equally'. 
It is hardly possible to specify this function very much further in 
general terms. The stats is not directly concerned with organising and 
directing the perfecting of individuals. Its role is rather the provision 
of facilities, the establishment of an environment conducive to human 
happiness and development. 
Looked on in this way, from the viewpoint of the relation of a state 
to its citizens, revolution presents itself as a technique for the reform 
of society to make it minister to its citizens as it should; a reform that 
contrasts to the more usual evolutionary type. 
One can, however, also consider revolution from the opposite point 
of view, that of the citizen relating himself to the state. The correct or 
ideal attitude towards one's country has been given a name 
- 
patriotism. 
It is important to realise that the fixing of a definition does not prove 
anything or close any questions. By resolving to use the word 'patriot 
ism' to refer to an admirable attitude to one's country, one has not 
determined what this attitude is. One must still enquire what patriotism 
is and what it demands - whether to die or to refuse to die, to over 
throw or to improve from within, to adulate or criticise, to work for or 
avail of. 
In fact, however, patriotism as it occurs is always something less than 
the ideal. It may in fact be a very unadmirable thing, a boastful over 
weening attitude of superiority, or it may be degraded to the hatred of 
a neighbouring nation. This is a human failing; but the failure to 
achieve ideals shows their importance, not their irrelevance. 
Revolution may appear as a patriotic action by the revolutionary, or 
even a patriotic duty. Alternatively it may be regarded as an un 
patriotic action, or even as a crime against patriotism. But in either 
case it presents itself as patriotic; this is the standard by which it 
wishes to be judged. 
What then is patriotism? The word itself provides a key. It de 
nominates one's country as a fatherland, and suggests that one's atti 
tude towards it should be a filial one, a mixture of gratitude and 
affection. Everyone derives very real benefits from his social environ 
ment. He takes on the identity and character of a people; he is moulded 
by a history, a literature, a language, an economy. What he is and can 
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hope to become is largely determined by the society 
that supports and 
challenges him. 
In this viewpoint patriotism is a realistic thing. The patriot realises 
that he has benefitted; he appreciates it, and is willing to acknowledge 
it, to attempt in some measure to requite it, and perhaps even to 
sacrifice himself for it. Patriotism is realistic because the benefits are 
real. 
There is however an air of business, of horse-trading, about this 
approach to patriotism. It is made to appear like a contract 
- do ut 
des. One's relations with one's parents are not business relations. If 
they were they would be utterly degraded. A business relationship 
with God would be similarly depraved. 
In addition to the recognition of favours there is also in patriotism 
a kind of personal and emotional attachment. The medievals had a 
concept they called pietas which lacked the exclusively religious conno 
tation and the rather depreciative tone of the derived English word 
*piety\ Patriotism as pietas is a recognition of benefits received com 
bined with an attachment which is emotional and personal. Patriotism 
is a feeling for the people, the race, the nation. 
Let me emphasise the contrast between the two elements of patriotism 
as they emerge here. Patriotism is least of all a hard-headed, realistic 
assessment of benefits received, and a recognition that a certain response 
is due : a response of loyality, cooperation and perhaps sacrifice. All of 
this is on the level of calculation. Notice that the assessment must be 
critical. No country is perfect; all are to some extent warlike, barbaric, 
illiberal. Patriotism not only permits of but demands the recognition of 
faults. We have inherited some of our faults as well as some of our 
values. 
In addition, patriotism is loyalty to one's country, even in spite of 
its faults. It is loved 'warts and all'. This is the affective, emotional 
aspect of patriotism. It is non-rational, non-critical, non-calculating. 
This does not make it irrational, any more than the love of a parent 
for a child is irrational. Rather it is a relation of service which is essen 
tially independent of any mutual benefit. 
I would suggest that these twin elements in patriotism 
- the calcula 
tion of utility and the personal involvement that spurns calculation - 
are matched by a parallel distinction within the object of patriotism. 
One's country is or should be both state and nation. The patriotic 
attitude to the state is critical and calculating; the patriotic attitude to 
the nation is affective. 
When one speaks of love of country, the word 'country' is ambig 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 21 Jan 2013 06:42:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REVOLUTION 9 
uous. There is the community of people 
- call it the nation; and there 
is the state, which is the organisation of the people. That we do regard 
state and nation as different things may be variously illustrated. For 
instance, we regard recent emigrants as still belonging to their own 
nation even though they become subjects of a new state. Similarly, 
in states that comprise several distinct nations 
? such as the United 
Kingdom prior to 1916, or the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to 
1918 - and in nations comprising several states 
- such as Germany 
today 
- 
nationalistic patriotism is inevitably anti-state. Clearly then 
state and nation must be recognisably distinct entities. Patriotism can 
be for or against a state. Therefore it is not directed primarily to a 
state at all, but to something else which the state is regarded as serving 
well or ill. That something else is what I am calling the nation. 
'Nation' is a very vague word indeed. Various attempts have been 
made to define it, most commonly in terms of race, language, culture 
or religion. But perhaps it can be adequately distinguished from the 
state in a simpler way. 
The state is the organisation of the people, the machinery of ad 
ministration and law. This is a technical thing, of which one can think 
dispassionately. It seems to me that there is little scope for emotion 
here. Every state is imperfect and in need of constant repair. It may 
become so decrepit that replacement is the sensible course. In particular 
it will be necessary to think of replacing it if it becomes an instrument 
of repression, if it is restricting instead of promoting the development 
of the people. 
The nation, on the other hand, is the people apart from their political 
organisation. For people are not brought together by a state; the state 
is the subsequent organisation of people who already possess some kind 
of unity. People are social, and new people are born into this society. 
They grow in a people, just as a plant grows in the decayed remnants 
of former growth. It is with the nation that one's loyalty lies. There 
is no disowning it, no alternative to it. There should be a feeling for the 
nation, for it is one's own people. This is the origin of the affective 
element in patriotism. 
However, I do not mean that there should be no critical component 
in one's attitude to the nation. Of course there must. Some peoples are 
lazy, others are dull or ambitious or unreliable; and all have a 
selection of skeletons in their historical cupboards. One is not called on 
to give unconditional approval. 
Similarly it is not true that there should be no emotional attachment 
to the state. Clearly there will be. Such things as the flag, the national 
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anthem and traditional ceremonials will be valued independently of 
utilitarian considerations. 
Although the parallel here suggested is not rigid, it is worth stressing 
on account of the disastrous consequences that follow from the 
reversal of the appropriate patriotic attitudes to state and nation. An 
unduly emotional attachment to the state 
- the organising coercing 
element - will surely lead to totalitarianism, expansionism, militarism. 
And an unduly detached critical attitude to the nation could lead to 
exaggerated cosmopolitanism, rootlessness, and in the long run, a 
general impoverishment of the spirit through the loss of the sense of 
belonging. If humanity is reduced to pure individuality it is a poor 
and stunted thing. 
There is one other characteristic of patriotism which I think is worth 
stressing 
- that it is relatively autocratic, intolerant; and that it is an 
uneasy bedfellow of democracy. 
Patriotism is intolerant of oppositon and of indifference. The reason 
is that it is felt to be something imposed, not in any way optional. If 
it is imposed on me, then it is imposed on all, because all have bene 
fited and all belong to the nation. Simple lack of interest is not 
regarded as a good defense. The person who is bored by football or 
bull-fighting may be pitied or despised, but he is not usually dragooned 
into conformism. He is perfectly entitled to be uninterested. But 
patriotism does not admit a right to be unpatriotic. 
In some ways the problem of patriotic intolerance is even more 
intractable than that of religious intolerance. For one can claim that 
religion is largely a matter for the individual, whereas patriotism is 
concerned precisely with the community. Hence the political com 
munity can tolerate religious non-conformism or indifference on 
grounds that cannot be adduced in justification of patriotic non-con 
formism or indifference - i.e. that it is a private and not a communal 
concern. Furthermore it is possible at least to attempt a clear partition 
between politics and religion, whereas no such partition is possible 
between politics and patriotism. 
Patriotism presents itself as a protestation that we are all our 
brothers' keepers. What a person does on patriotic grounds he does 
not for himself but for the community; and the community may not 
want it. But the fact that what he does for the community is repudiated 
by the community does not apparently prevent his doing it on patriotic 
grounds. The patriot who endeavours to 'awaken' his community 
appears untroubled in his patriotism by the fact that the community 
regards itself as wide awake already, or by their emphatic preference 
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for the allegedly unawakened state. Patriotism then can be an un 
democratic thing, in that the patriot can be tempted to act on behalf of 
the people without asking the people, or even against the wishes of the 
people. He knows what is good for the people, and the fact that they 
repudiate it shows that they need to be coerced, not consulted. At its 
furthest extreme the patient's protestations of good health prove the 
seriousness of his illness. 
Of course one should not regard the difficulty that patriotism has in 
getting along with democracy as automatically condemning it. As far as 
I know there is no country in the world today that does not claim to 
be a democracy. In that case the word 'democracy' must be almost 
meaningless. And, even in our own type of society, it is only in a 
rather global way that political decisions are taken by popular vote. 
Nevertheless the relative intolerance of patriotism is particularly im 
portant in a revolutionary situation. There may be revolutions that have 
massive popular support; but there are many, defended on patriotic 
grounds, that lack any substantial support. It should however be 
remembered that generally the revolutionary cannot campaign for sup 
port. The surprise on which he relies for success is also liable to ensure 
lack of popular support. 
Furthermore, revolutions sometimes occur in situations where there are 
no accepted democratic procedures. For instance, supposing there were 
an attempt to incorporate Gibralter into Spain by revolutionary means, 
it might reasonably be pointed out that there are no recognised pro 
cedures whereby the citizens of Gibralter, Spain and Britain can be 
consulted instead and the wishes of each given their proper weight. 
It is a fearful responsibility for a small number of people to take on 
themselves to destroy the society that most people are content to live 
and die in. No doubt that society is not perfect; no society ever was or 
will be, in spite of all the best-intentioned revolutions. 
VARIETIES AND STATISTICS 
Before going on to speak of the morality of revolution let me say some 
thing of its varieties and statistics. 
There are two general categories of revolution 
- the nationalistic 
and the reformist. All nationalistic revolutions spring from the alleged 
discrepancy between state and nation. Where several nations are in 
corporated in a single state or empire there is pressure by the various 
nations to achieve independent statehood. The more distant colonies 
are often the first to succeed, for instance the United States and the 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 21 Jan 2013 06:42:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 THE MAYNOOTH REVIEW 
Spanish possessions in South America. These de-clonising revolutions 
have been concentrated in the past century, and there can be very few 
left to occur; but there is another type of nationalistic revolution which 
is still very much with us. Nations which have become incorporated 
in a strongly centralised and geographically compact state find it much 
more difficult to achieve independence. Contemporary examples would 
be the Scots, Serbs, Croatians and Basques. 
It is these nationalistic revolutions that generate most passion, and 
which are the most likely to degenerate into civil war when they are 
partly successful. They spring from an idealogy of freedom and a 
long-remembered distinctiveness. This becomes sufficiently disseminated 
among the people to generate a political movement. This in turn 
produces a military movement to further the political aim. When some 
military success has been achieved there can arise a clash between the 
politics and the ideology. The ideology is an idealism which, while 
striving to be timeless, is in fact condit:oned by the past. Politics, on 
the other hand, is the art of what is possible now. The acceptance of 
a partial independence which is offered can be seen as the repudiation 
of the ideal which is not fully attainable now. People who share a 
common ideology can differ on matters of political decision, and even 
resort to arms to 'settle' their differences. 
The other kind of revolution I call reformist. In this there are no 
problems of nationality or territory; the grievance is rather that the state 
is not functioning satisfactorily. One can distinguish several forms. 
There is first of all a radical changing of the whole form of the state, 
on the grounds that the existing structures are unsuitable or outdated 
or instruments of repression. The modern Cuban revolution is an 
example. There are other revolutions in which the structures are left 
unchanged, but the leaders, who are alleged to be misbehaving in some 
way, are replaced. Finally there is the sheer take-over of power, by 
power. This is of no theoretical interest. 
The reformist type of revolution promises to be more common in 
the future than the nationalistic. Nationalism appears to be evolving in 
the direction of internationalism, whereas reform is a perennial need. 
Systems of political organisation tend to ossify, whereas the ensuring 
of justice and liberty demands a constant adaptation to changing 
circumstances. It is contended, for instance, that Western society today 
is lacking in justice because it perpetuates a gross maldistribution of 
wealth on a global scale. It is further contended that it is lacking in 
liberty because it is based on the creation of artificial needs and the 
pressuring of people to pursue them. Where, it is asked, is the liberty 
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of people who will inevitably waste like everybody else, 
work the same 
hours as everybody else, submit to the same education and communica 
tions, and indulge in the same Jeisure, suburban living, commuting, 
insuring and labour saving as everybody else? 
Reform is a constant political demand. Ideally it should be a rational 
evolution; but if evolution is frustrated revolution presents itself as an 
alternative means. 
There have always been revolutions 
- consider Barrabbas for in 
stance who was amnestied in unusual circumstances - but they have 
recently become more common, more successful and less dangerous. 
The old-style revolution was often a spontaneous demonstration of frus 
tration, and often deliberately induced by the government to strengthen 
its own position. Typically it was unsuccessful, and was followed by 
savage, extensive and indiscriminate revenge. But things have changed. 
The coup d'etat type of revolution has now become much more skill 
ful. Ideally nobody should be killed, and shooting has gone quite out 
of fashion. The important elements are closing airports, capturing radio 
stations and issuing proclamations. 
The most revolutionary area of the world in recent times has been 
South America. In the twenty years 1945 to 1964 there were forty six 
revolutions there, of which twenty nine succeeded; whereas the re 
mainder of the world shared forty two in that time, of which twenty 
seven succeeded. Africa and Asia are the next most prolific continents. 
North America and Australia, on the other hand, have had no revolu 
tions at all in recent times. We tend not to think of Europe as a re 
volutionary area, but in fact there has been a great deal of revolutionary 
activity there in this century, even if you leave Ireland out of account. 
Portugal had a revolution last year, Spain in the 1930s, Greece in 1946 
and 1967, Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968, Hungary in 1956, Turkey 
in 1960, Cyprus in the 1950s and again in 1972; and there has been 
sporadic revolutionary trouble in Brittany, Spain, Greece, Gibralter, 
Wales, Scotland, Italy and Yugoslavia. That is a formidable tally for an 
area which we tend to regard as politically stable. 
While revolution is a very varied phenomenon, it is nevertheless 
possible to define the term: I would suggest the following: 
A revolution is a violent and allegedly patriotic attempt to radi 
cally reorganise the state with which a nation coexists territorially, 
on the grounds that the common good is being neglected and will 
be better promoted by the post-revolutionary state 
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This definition is really geared to the nationalistic variety of revolution. 
It excludes the sheer take-over of power, which arguably should not be 
called revolution at all. Finally, if it is to fit the non-radical reformist 
type of revolution one should not insist on the phrase 'radically re 
organise'. 
MORALITY AND REVOLUTION 
In the early stages of the Christian era the moral theory of revolution 
got very little attention. It received its main development only in 
medieval and more especially in modern times. Early Christianity was 
not political reformist, and in any case regarded the earthly city as 
rather unimportant. The breakthrough came in medieval times with the 
recognition that a ruler who commanded what God prohibited, or 
vice versa, had no standing. Ha could be disobeyed, or even super 
seded. Aquinas reached this point, a very limited and reluctant allow 
ance of revolution. 
The Reformation further developed the theory, for it was itself a 
revolution. If you agreed with it you regarded it as justified; if you did 
not you regarded it as the most unjustified of all. Revolt against a mere 
earthly potentate palled into insignificance compared to revolt against 
God's arrangements for salvation. 
The reformers respectabilised revolution in another way. They ac 
corded to the civil ruler a large measure of control over religious 
affairs, with the proviso that the ruler should be suitably 'godly'. The 
effect of this was to reverse the control; for certain religious persons 
would have to decide whether their ruler was a suitable person to 
exercise religious power over them. This means that in certain circum 
stances one might be obliged to revolt against one's ruler and to replace 
him. It is this aspect of the theory that is operative in seventeenth 
century England where, largely on grounds of religion, one king was 
executed and another forced to flee: and this in a country that has 
not been revolutionary before or since. At the end of the seventeenth 
century in England you get some very careful discussion of the morality 
of revolution. It has to be careful, lest the theory which justifies the 
deposition of the former king might also justify the deposition of his 
successor. 
The next epoch of revolutionary theory centres on the American and 
French revolutions, and the more generalised outbreak of nationalism 
in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. Thereafter you are down to 
our own times. This is the era of nationalist, anti-colonial revolutions, 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 21 Jan 2013 06:42:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REVOLUTION 15 
such as those in Algeria and Cyprus and Angola, and of revolutions 
springing from a demand for reform such as those 
in Cuba and China. 
There is the emergence of other new revolutionary theories, such as 
that of communism, that concerned with the unequal division of wealth 
on a world-wide scale, and that which claims the need for revolution to 
break the depersonalising character of western capitalism. 
Over the centuries there lias evolved a theory of the morality of revolu 
tion which has won very general acceptance. It is closely akin to the 
traditional Just War Theory, and like it regards revolution as per 
missible provided certain conditions are fulfilled. There is no definitive 
list or formulation of these conditions, but the following would, I 
believe, be generally accepted. 
1. There must be a situation of grave tyranny. 
2. Other means of redress must have been exhausted. 
3. There must be some probability of success. 
4. The evil caused by the revolution should be outweighed by the 
good that will be done or the evil that will be suppressed. 
5. There must be some popular support. 
In evaluating a theory of this sort one must first of all determine what 
precisely it is that the theory can offer. One must then refrain from 
presenting it as offering more than it can deliver; and one must equally 
refrain from criticising it for not being what it does not purport to be. 
Let me explain. There are all sorts of situations where a decision 
can be reached by the application of objective, impersonal tests. The 
litmus paper will differentiate acids and alkalis; and the make-up of 
the spinal fluid will tell if its owner has meningitis. Such procedures 
provide an answer which is totally unrelated to one's wishes. You may 
like or dislike what you find out, but preference has nothing whatever 
to do with what you find out. Your personal attitude of approval or 
disapproval of the meningitic condition of spinal fluid is totally irrele 
vant to your judgement that the person has or has not meningitis. One 
does of course speak of evaluating the results of tests in such situations. 
This is merely a perversity of usage. The whole point of such tests is 
that they take place exclusively within the factual realm. Non-factual 
evaluations ('my favourite virus'!) are out of order. 
The traditional moral theory of revolution presents itself as a test 
whereby one is enabled to determine whether any given revolution is 
justifiable or not. But here the test is not, and cannot be, a purely 
factual one. One man's 
'grave tyranny' is another man's 'firm govern 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 21 Jan 2013 06:42:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
16 THE MAYNOOTH REVIEW 
ment'. In contrast it is not the case that one scientists 'virus X' is 
another scientist's 4virus Y\ Even if there were total agreement on the 
facts of a given political situation, the question whether this political 
situation constituted grave tyranny could not be resolved by a defini 
tion, as it can be in the case of scientific tests. An evaluative judgement 
must intervene. It is because, among other reasons, the political situa 
tion is adjudged iniquitous or intolerable that revolution in the cir 
cumstances is regarded as morally permissible. In other words, the 
criteria of the morality of revolution are moral critera, not factual 
criteria. Nor is this difference an accidental one. Even if we supposed 
that everyone in all circumstances agreed on what was and was not 
grave tyranny, one still has not matched the scientific situation; for 
the criterion of grave tyranny is still an evaluative and not a factual 
one. 
To insist that the moral theory of revolution presents a, moral rather 
than a scientific test is not to dismiss the theory either as false or as 
useless, but rather to point to its true character as a moral theory. It 
is to be expected, for instance, that people whose valuations of politi 
cal situations and revolutionary practices differ will also differ in the 
conclusions they derive from this theory 
- even if they all equally 
accept the theory. Such a state of affairs would be unacceptable if 
one were dealing with a scientific test. 
The traditional theory of revolution does not provide a test of such 
a kind that if several people apply it to the same situation and arrive at 
different judgements, the test is not thereby shown to be inadequate or 
the users of it incompetent or deceitful. What the theory does is to 
present the various values that must be taken into account in making a 
moral evaluation of revolution. As such it is a series of headings; these 
headings denominate matters of great complexity. In pointing to this 
complexity one is not refuting the theory, but rather explaining and 
expanding it. 
All five conditions point, in different ways, to the central role of the 
common good. Tyranny is the spurning of it. Non-revolutionary means 
are to be preferred as less disruptive of it. Probability of success is 
demanded because one may not take foolish risks with it. The reason 
for the insistence that the good must outweigh the evil is that otherwise 
it will suffer. And the demand for consent emphasises its communal 
nature. 
In addition, these five traditional criteria point to certain values and 
anti-values which help to indicate whether a revolution will promote or 
militate against the common good. Let us consider these in turn. 
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(1) Grave tyranny is restriction of liberty beyond the demands of 
security and organisational efficiency. The judgement concerning the kind 
of political situation which constitutes grave tyranny, while 
not arbit 
rary, it still a matter of personal evaluation. There is no factual system 
of measurement which will determine how much oppression of how 
many for how long will constitute grave tyranny. This condition presents 
the claims of liberty. This is a value which must not be sacrificed to 
security and efficiency. Despotism is not saved by being benevolent, 
nor foreign domination by its providing efficient administration, 
(2) The demand that other means be exhausted before revolution is 
embarked on is an insistence that the violence of revolution is an anti 
value. As such it is never accepted with enthusiasm but only with 
reluctance and as a last resort. Of course the exhaustion of other 
means is metaphorical, for political organisation and agitation may go 
on endlessly. It is people who become exhausted, when they demand 
success in the short term. There is no factual way of determining how 
many people must have tried for how long and with what degree of 
actual and prospective success for this demand to be met. What it 
does is not to present a factual test, but rather to insist that violence, 
because it is an anti-value, should not be resorted to unless one is 
satisfied that no other means has any prospects of success* 
(3) The third condition, that there be some probability of success, 
emphasises the subordinate, instrumental character of revolution. It is 
acceptable, if it is acceptable at all, not for what it is, but only for what 
it accomplishes. This is another factor to be taken into account, but 
again there is no applicable measurement system. One cannot quantify 
the chances of success, nor the degree of success. There is no scope for 
precision and great scope for disagreement. Inevitably, the kind and 
degree of prospective success that will satisfy one person will not satisfy 
another. It is even possible to rate total military failure as adequate 
success, on the grounds that it may keep alive the spark of national 
identity. In general, this condition demands that if revolution is to be 
justified, the prospects of success and the degree of envisaged success 
must be such as would satisfy a reasonable man. The reasonable man, 
in this context, is he who assigns due weight to all the relevant values. 
Such judgements cannot be cut and dried and beyond controversy. 
(4) The fourth condition, that the good to be achieved by revolution 
should outweigh the harm that it causes, is an insistence that revolution 
is a mixture of good and bad, and that one cannot justify it without 
regarding the evil as tolerable for the sake of the good. This patently 
evaluative procedure is expressed metaphorically as the comparison of 
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two quantities; but there are no units of good and evil and no 
externally observable method of comparison. 
That revolution may do good is the whole purpose of it. The good 
is the social reform that is envisaged, and the resultant benefits accruing 
to the citizen. But the evil is equally real, and much of it is ineradicable. 
There is the obvious harm of injury and death and destruction, of im 
prisonment and outlawing, of the disruption of business and family life, 
of lasting bitterness and hatreds. There is also the more far-reaching 
harm of social disruption. Society is a delicate web of relationships 
and trusts which once fractured is not easily repaired. The laws may be 
harsh and cruel but there may still be more discernment to them than 
to a gun in the hands of a man grown callous of violence. Society is a 
delicately balanced fragile thing, and it is easier to bring violence into it 
than to take it out again. The confidence that lets men sleep unafraid 
of every sound in the night, that lets them walk the streets or speak 
their minds without fear - these are delicate and valuable things, and 
they are not easily restored. 
(5) The final condition, that there be some degree of popular support, 
emphasises the communal nature of revolution. It is concerned with the 
better organisation of the people's society for the people's benefit. 
Revolution, in other words, is a representative function not a private 
initiative. There are many things that do not need to be justified; one 
does not argue for the toleration of virtue and education and family 
loyalty. But revolution is not in this category. Even though it presents 
itself as the irruption of heroism and unselfishness into the petty 
wrangle of politics, it is not there as of right. Its standing derives from 
its necessity as recognised by the people. 
The revolutionary is not merely accountable to the people, he stands 
in need of some kind of mandate from the people. However, revolu 
tionaries are not elected, and frequently they dare not canvass support. 
In fact the more need and justification there is for revolution the less 
the support is liable to be. The really efficient tyranny is the one that 
stifles the will for freedom. 
Here again we encounter the impossibility of precision. To demand 
majority support in advance of revolution is in many cases to demand 
the impossible; and it would be a very unreasonable moral theory which 
would extend moral support to a tyrannical regime on account of its 
efficiency in suppressing the will to resist. To delete the demand for 
popular support, on the other hand, would be to ignore the communal 
nature of revolution. Between these extremes one must insist on such 
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support as can be reasonably expected in the circumstances. Here again 
there is no scope for precision and much for disagreement. 
This traditional theory of the morality of revolution leaves many 
people with the feeling that it is in some way inadequate or incomplete. 
One main reason for dissatisfaction is, I think, the misunderstanding 
of the possibilities of moral theory to which I have been referring. 
A more important source, however, is the feeling that the theory con 
stitutes only the final stage of a more complete theory. Such a theory 
might be outlined in three stages as follows: 
(1) Revolution is a resort to violence, and violence is an anti-value, 
a failure of human relations. Even if it is the best available alternative 
revolution is still regrettable; it should not be clothed in a robe of 
glory. Killing and destruction are bad. This is the primary moral 
consideration which tends to be forgotten on account of its simplility. 
(2) Society must exert itself to establish procedures which will make 
revolution unnecessary and preferably impossible. This might be done 
by an international authority. Alternatively, and perhaps better, it might 
be done by an intra-state body. This would, of course, present enor 
mous difficulties, but one should not assume that these are insuperable. 
Such a body would need sufficient independence and authority to im 
pose its will on both the state organisation and the prospective 
revolutionaries. The independence and power presently afforded to the 
judiciary, the Ombudsman, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
the electoral boundaries commission (in Britain) would suggest that the 
project is not entirely unrealistic. 
(3) Until such time as such alternative procedures are established, 
there will be situations in which there is no reasonable alternative to 
revolution, which will then be justified provided the conditions of the 
traditional theory are fulfilled. 
One great advantage of the traditional theory, however, is that it rules 
out judgement of revolution by peripheral issues. It is important that 
revolution be not condemned solely on grounds of malpractice or 
regrettable accident. 
During the Easter Week rebellion of 1916, according to Mrs. Hamilton 
Norway, the horses at a riding-school behind the GPO were burnt to 
death, and various of her valuables were stolen by the insurgents. If 
these things happened they are regrettable, but they are not central. 
Terrible things happen in all revolutions, but one is not thereby com 
mitted to condemning all revolutions. 
Probably the most common ground for the condemnation of revolution 
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is the occurrence of malpractice of one sort or another 
- 
vendettas, 
intimidation, theft, protection rackets and assorted other forms of 
injustice. I suppose there has never been a revolution in which no 
scores have been settled and no nests feathered. Revolution, however, 
is not the only enterprise beset by human frailty. Lawyers lose cases 
and doctors lose patients that should not be lost; teachers sometimes 
impress by obfuscating. But the practice is not automatically to be 
condemned on account of the malpractice. Revolutionary malpractice 
must be taken into account as one of the kinds of evil which the 
revolution will, hopefully, counterbalance by the reforms which it 
induces. 
Another advantage of the traditional theory is that it invites com 
parison between revolution and other forms of violence, particularly 
war; for there is a parallel Just War Theory. 
Many people are inclined to regard war as justified because it has 
official authorisation, and revolution as unjustified because it has not 
This is perverse; principally because the nature of revolution precludes 
official authorisation, but also because, morally speaking, war is worse 
than revolution. Wars have killed twenty-five million people in this 
century, and it is hard to see that they have produced any counter 
balancing good. Revolutions have produced no Utopias, but some of 
them have been influential for good in spite of their failures. The 
French Revolution degenerated into terror and eventually into despo 
tism, yet the world has been the better of it. 
There is more demanded of the revolutionary than of the soldier. 
His is an open-ended commitment with no time limit. If one attempt 
does not succeed he may spend twenty years in prison, and then feel 
compelled to start again 
- a terrifying prospect for a young man. 
There is an isolation and silence imposed, a living out of one's own 
resources that does not belong in war. The revolutionary must make his 
own decision to cross the line between law and outlaw. It is a decision 
which is beset with uncertainties. The grievances may be imaginary or 
inevitably disappearing; the constitutional way may be better; the revolu 
tion may make things worse, it may be contra-indicated, unnecessary, 
tragic; the rebel may be duped or misguided or misinformed. He will, 
at least ideally, weigh all of these factors, and his decision is unlikely 
to be dictated by self-interest or conformism. 
LONGTERM DANGERS 
In conclusion I would stress two unfortunate consequences which are 
liable to flow from revolution. The first is its tendency to promote the 
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periodic recurrence of revolutions; the second its tendency to depreciate 
the profession of politics. 
A revolution is designed to establish a new and better political order 
which will render revolution uncalled for. The revolution will, at best, 
only partly succeed; yet the political order which it establishes will, 
like any conceivable political order, ban revolution. The original, rela 
tively successful, revolutionaries will inevitable resist any revolutionary 
attempt to oust them; yet it can reasonably be claimed that the relative 
failure of the original revolution justifies a revolutionary attempt to 
renew or complete or reorientate or update it, or rescue it from devia 
tionists, foreign lackeys and running dogs. Revolution, it has been well 
said, is like a runaway train; it acquires an impetus of its own and is 
extraordinarily difficult to stop. I can see no solution to this problem 
until people recognise that revolution 
? like assassination and ransom 
and enslavement and torture and lettres de cachet - is an improper 
political procedure; and, having recognised that, establish such machi 
nery for the redress of grievances as will render it both impossible and 
unnecessary. 
A further unfortunate consequence of revolution it its tendency to 
downgrade the status of politics. Revolutionaries are committed to con 
demning the politics of their time as futile and impotent. Their revolu 
tion is based on the claim that politics has utterly failed to make any 
progress towards the laudable ideals which they profess. But in de 
nouncing a local and contemporary failure of politics, the revolutionary 
may slip into quite unjustified denunciation of the contemporary poli 
ticians. The practice of politics is always demanding, but never more so 
than in revolutionary times. The revolutionary has no monopoly of 
courage and idealism. 
The denunciation of the failure of politics may extend even to the 
devaluation of politics itself. This is certainly wrong; for 
politics is a perennial need, whereas revolution is tolerable only for 
the political objectives which it can, sometimes, promote. When the 
revolution is over somebody will have to pick up the pieces. The 
practice of politics must go on. Hopefully the politicians of the new 
order will include both the politicians and the revolutionaries of the 
old. 
Matthew O'Donnell, B.D., Ph.D. 
St. Patrick's College, Professor of Philosophy 
Maynooth. 
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